PSIA, Master in International Development
timber forest products, stock farming and rearing, subsistence and commercial hunting, trophy sport hunting (consumptive tourism), non-consumptive (photographic) tourism, etc. ; third, different types of actors compete or cooperate to operate those activities. Those groups are : local communities, the public sector with government agencies and para-statal companies, the private sector, donors and NGOs etc. ; ﬁnally fourth, economic NRbased activities result in an output (whether a good or a service) and thus generate revenues and/ or means of subsistence which are captured and (re)distributed among actors. Several important issues are to be analysed along this sequence : When generating income from various activities, all actors compete against each other for common natural resources. If these resources are not excludable (everyone can easily and freely use the resource) and rival (the use of a NR by my neighbours reduces the possible use of the same NR by myself), i.e. these NR are common-pool resources (CPR), and competition is not regulated, ﬁnite NR could be well totally depleted. This is the ‘resource utilization problem' (session 2), which will be analysed in greater details in this course through the analysis of the necessary emergence of institutions, in particular property rights, whether private, public or common (sessions 3 to 5). When operating economic activities in rural areas, each actor can separately operate and capture the whole revenue ; or different actors can combine their skills and assets and enter into partnerships. The question is precisely to analyse how to structure and organize these actors so that economic activities would generate the more rural income. This is the 'efﬁciency problem', which will be analysed when dealing with the question of governance structures (sessions 6-11). Nevertheless, analysing the efﬁciency problem is not enough. Once revenues have been generated from NR-based activities, those rents have to be captured and distributed among actors that have contributed partly or fully to the production process (whether they hold ﬁnancial, human or natural assets or are employed, etc.). This is 'the redistribution problem'. Indeed, poverty alleviation and conservation of environment (resource utilization) are highly depending on a fair distri-
bution of income among users (all sessions from session 3). This course will analyse these issues of resource allocation, efﬁciency and income distribution in CPR institutions in several geographical contexts. Objective of the course : building on theory (political economy, new institutionalism with Nobel prize laureates Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson) as well as empirical examples (cases studies), this course aims at providing students with an understanding of local conﬂicts over land and common natural resources (ﬁsheries, pastures, forests, wildlife, etc.) and the possible institutional mechanisms which potentially lead to sustainable resource management and poverty alleviation at the local level. Required reading : Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, p. 280 ; Platteau, J.P. (2003), « Droits de propriété et gestion efﬁcace des ressources naturelles », Les Séminaires de l‘Iddri, n° 10, Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales, Paris ; Williamson, O.E. (2000), “The New Institutional Economics : Taking Stock, Looking Ahead”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, pp. 595-613.
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS : MACROECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ECONOMIC ISSUES
Semester : Autumn Number of hours : 42 Language of tuition : English
Teachers : Yasmine BEKKOUCHE (Assistante de recherche), Julia CAGÉ (Enseignant/Chercheur (Assistant Professor) en Economie). Pedagogical format : Lecture alone Course validation : A mid-term take-home exam (25%) ; ﬁnal paper (75%). Students are required to write a ﬁnal paper that examines an important question related t